INTRODUCTION
Daniel Wolfe (formerly of the NSA) defined assured information sharing (AIS) as a framework that "provides the ability to dynamically and securely share information at multiple classification levels among U.S., allied and coalition forces." As stated in the DoD information sharing strategy document, the DoD's vision for AIS is to "deliver the power of information to ensure mission success through an agile enterprise with freedom of maneuverability across the information environment". Our objective is to help achieve this vision by defining an AIS lifecycle and developing a framework to realize it.
To address the information sharing strategy of the DoD, we are conducting research on this topic under an AFOSR MURI project. Our research is framed by a set of AIS requirements relevant to applications found in the DoD, government and industry. The significant research contributions of our project will include the definition of an AIS Lifecycle (AISL) that is driven by the 4Vs (volume, veracity, velocity, vector) as well as cross-cutting requirements and the development of (1) a framework based on a secure semantic event-based service-oriented architecture to realize the life cycle, (2) novel policy languages, reasoning engines, negotiation strategies, and security infrastructures, (3) techniques to exploit social networks to enhance AISL, (4) techniques for federated information integration, discovery and quality validation, and (5) techniques for incentivized assured information sharing. The research is carried out by a coalition of six institutions: The University of Maryland, Baltimore County (SOA, Semantic Web), Purdue (Policies and Security), The University of Texas at Dallas (Incentives and Knowledge Management), University of Illinois Urbana Champaign (Information Management), The University of Texas at San Antonio (Policy and Applications) and the University of Michigan (Social Networks).
Since we proposed the effort in October 2007 and started the project in mid 2008, a lot of initiatives have been proposed on AIS by the US Government and its allies. In addition, the DoD also published its Information Sharing Implementation Plan in April 2009. Other notable efforts include the Department of Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the Department of Homeland Security Information Sharing Strategy and the Office of National Intelligence Information Sharing Strategy. In this report, we will summarize the various efforts of the US Government on information sharing. With respect to our efforts, we now have international partners (Kings College, London and University of Insubria, Italy). We also have a sister project funded by AFOSR on secure cloud computing that is developing secure infrastructures and data managers for clouds (The University of Texas at Dallas and Purdue). As part of the joint initiative between the two projects, we are demonstrating assured information sharing in a cloud environment with our international partners.
This report is an evolving document and will be updated periodically. Our MURI project will review the information in this document and will enhance its current research efforts based on guidance provided by the DoD and other agencies. The organization of this document is as follows. Section 2 discusses general issues in assured information sharing. DoD's information sharing strategy and implementation plan will be discussed in Section 3. Justice Information Sharing Initiative including its NIEM (National Information Exchange Model) will be discussed in Section 4. DHS information sharing strategy will be discussed in Section 5. Office of National Intelligence information sharing strategy will be discussed in Section 6. National Information Sharing Strategy proposed by the White House to (coordinate the efforts of the DoD, DOJ, IC, and DHS as well as the efforts of the International partners) will be discussed in Section 7. Efforts of the Department of Health and Human Services as well as other US Government efforts will be discussed in Section 8. International efforts will be discussed in Section 9. Our views will be discussed in Section 10.
SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL FOR ASSURED INFORMATION SHARING
As stated in Section 1, to fight the global war on terror, organizations have to share data but at the same time enforce appropriate policies. We need to understand clearly what it means to migrate from a need to know to a need to share paradigm. Even if the culture is moving toward need to share, we still have to protect the critical assets of the nation. Therefore, we need to enforce appropriate policies and procedures. We have drawn an analogy between information sharing and the theory of supply chain management. The partners in producing a data product need to have common incentives, share the risks, and work towards producing the best product possible but at the same time ensure the individual autonomy.
Our goal is to develop a data supply chain model to develop data products that can be shared among the agencies/coalition partners. That is, each data product is developed according to the rules of a data supply chain model. In order for a successful data chain-based approach, the partners of the supply chain also have to share the information, risks and costs. Furthermore, the incentives have to be aligned every step of the way. This means that the approaches used in supply chain management have to be examined for data supply chain management. In addition, several information management technologies play an important role.
Suppose a customer needs a data product. The first step is to determine who to go to to get the data. This means we need metadata that will guide us in getting the locations of the individuals who possess the raw materials (i.e. the raw data). The raw data will be in data sources. The next step is to determine how to get the data from A to B in the form we need. What are the transformations to the data? What path should the data take? How is the data stored at the intermediate locations? Technologies that we need for this process are (i) integration of heterogeneous data sources (ii) cleaning the data every step of the way (iii) understanding the provenance of the data (iv) enforcing appropriate polices -e.g. is the combined data at a higher classification level than the individual pieces of the data?, and (vi) extracting the data that is needed for the processing of the data at every stage.
Conducting this entire process in real-time is a challenge. Therefore, concepts from the raw data such as email, chats, blogs, web pages and social media pages have to be extracted and linked to for networks. This process has to be carried out continuously so that if and when a customer needs a data product, many of the components are already there. This is similar to using existing raw material for a product rather than trying to develop new raw material. The linked data also has to be analyzed so that the nuggets are produced for effective knowledge management of a corporation or an agency. Therefore, some of the key technologies include semantic web for representing the vast amount of heterogeneous data, data mining for extracting concepts from the data, network analysis, and knowledge management.
Another challenge is to get the right amount of the right parts at the right time to the consumer. That is, if the parts do not arrive on time, then the supply chain process will be disrupted. Also, if there are too many parts supplied (i.e. too much inventory) then it will be very costly. We have heard about the CISCO situation when the company lost several millions of dollars due to too much inventory. Therefore, we need appropriate inventory management techniques. This is also the situation for data. We need the right data at the right time to go to the right place. If the data does not arrive on time, then there will be a delay introducing the final product and this delay could be not just costly but also deadly. Similarly, if there is too much data, then the consumer has to sort the data and extract only the relevant data to complete the data product.
In summary, here are the parallels between data supply chain and regular supply chain. At the lowest level in the data side, you have raw data such as emails and blogs; in the regular supply chain side, you have the nuts, bolts, cement (in the case of building say a house). At the intermediate level, you have the network in the data side which will include the nodes and links extracted from the raw data. At the supply chain side you have the doors, windows, and the foundation among other things. At the finish line on the data side, you have the complete data product which could be the negates (i.e., knowledge) extracted from the networks. At the regular supply chain side, you have the complete house. At every step there are policies. For the data side, you have confidentiality policies, integrity policies and administrative policies. At the supply chain side, you have the regulations and guidelines to building a house. In Section 2.2, we will summarize the DoD Information Sharing Strategy and in Section 2.3, we will summarize the DoD Information Sharing Implementation Plan. As new information becomes available, we will update this document on information sharing strategies of the US Federal Government.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Overview
DoD Information Sharing Strategy
In May 2007, the DoD CIO published a document [DOD1] that articulated DoD's Information Sharing Strategy. The vision for information sharing is to "develop the power of information to ensure mission success through an agile enterprise with freedom of maneuverability across the information environment". To achieve this vision, the DoD has formulated the following four goals: (i) "Promote, encourage and incentivize sharing", (ii) "Achieve an extended enterprise", (iii) "Strengthen the agility in order to accommodate unanticipated partners and events", and (iv) "Ensure trust across organizations". DoD has stated that the four information sharing goals will be realized through five approaches. Our strategy on our MURI project is to develop solutions to implement these five approaches (Finin, 2009 DoD's Information Sharing Strategy document also discusses implementation considerations. In particular, the DoD states that five cross-cutting areas called the five key touchstones are: Culture, Policy, Economic Resources, Governance, Technology and Infrastructure. Essentially, the DoD states that there has to be a culture switch so that information sharing is promoted and encouraged. Policies, procedure and guidelines have to be in place to guide sharing. Governance stature has to be established, Incentives will be taken into consideration in the building and resource allocation process. Finally, the DoD will leverage its many investments in building technologies and infrastructures and make new investments to support the net-centric environment. We believe that (i) the technologies we are developing in our MURI project, (ii) the breakthrough incentive-based information sharing approaches we are developing, and (iii) the cloud computing infrastructures embraced by the DoD will significantly contribute toward solutions for information sharing. In the next section, we will discuss the implementation plan for information sharing that was published by the DoD in April 2009.
DoD Information Sharing Implementation Plan
The DoD Information Sharing Implementation plan [DOD2] has identified ten focus areas to implement the strategy discussed in Section 2.2. In each of the focus areas, the implementation plan gives an overview of the area, the tasks to be carried out, the details of the tasks and the DoD organization responsible for implementing the tasks. The tasks are identified by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commands, military services and defense agencies (called CC/S/A). In this section, we will summarize the focus areas and list the tasks. For more details, we refer to (DoD, 2009 ). We will also discuss how we are addressing the various focus areas in our project.
Focus Area 1: Managing Information Sharing in the DoD
It is stated that the DoD must share infrastructures in a timely manner not only with the war fighters but also with other agencies for intelligence, counter-terrorism and stability operations. Therefore, coordination is critical. To ensure coordination, the DoD states that a governance structure must be established. 
Task 2.4 Determine the applicability of and expand if validated the NORAD/USNORTHCOM IEB concept to other CC/S/As to enhance organizational information exchange processes and procedures."
Focus Area 3: Leveraging the Power of Social Networks
DoD is promoting social networking among its personnel by providing them with tools and technologies. For example, the DKO (Defense Knowledge Online) has enabled the DoD community to use shared spaces, provided them with tools for information sharing and best practices. However, DoD has some concerns about its personnel using public social networking websites due to security concerns. Therefore, the risks associated with the social networks have to be taken into consideration.
"Tasks 3.1 Develop a plan to leverage modern social networking capabilities appropriately within the DoD."
Focus Area 4: Operationalizing Information Sharing
It is stated that information sharing is critical for mission success. Therefore, it has and will continue to carry out joint exercises and demonstrations with respect to information sharing to determine the gaps and opportunities. Examples include the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) which the USNORTHCOM hosted for homeland defense. 
Focus Area 5: Removing Sharing Barriers created by Improper Classification
Appropriate classification of national security information is critical to protect the information and safeguard the nation. However, it is stated that the overclassification of information will also be a barrier to national security. This is because the right information may not arrive at the right time due to extensive security controls. Therefore, the implementation plan states that automated tools for properly classifying the information are needed. 
Focus Area 7: Sharing Information for Enhanced Operations
It is stated that mission partner information sharing is to be the number one priority of the combatant commands. Yet, at present, each combatant command uses its own technologies and infrastructures. The end result is a proliferation of networks and infrastructures. It is therefore important that the SOA-based Global Information Grid information assurance capabilities are provided in the national networks and the networks shared with the coalition partners. 
Focus Area 8: Extending Identity and Access Management
This area deals mainly with identity management and access control solutions. The individual's identity has to be verified through trust means. The individual's authorization to access information is determined. Business rules for classifying information as well as determining controlled unclassified information (CUI) prescribe why access to the information is needed. Identity management is handled thorough Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and common access cards (CAC). HSPD-12/FIPS-201 is being examined (this is the Home Security Presidential Directive 12 and a NIST publication). In addition, DoD and DNI are promoting ABAC (Attribute based access control) solutions. In our research under the MURI project, we are addressing some of the focus areas. In particular, incentives for information sharing are a major goal. We are conducting experiments to show how incentives will enhance information sharing. In addition, the use of social networks to promote sharing is also being investigated. We are also conducting extensive research on policy-based information sharing and developing novel access control technologies for information sharing. Our infrastructure is based on semantic SOA that essentially integrates SOSA with semantic web technologies. Finally, we are conducting information sharing experiments among the team members as well as with our European partners (Kings College London, University of Insubria).
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Overview
One of the major concerns that came out of 9/11 was the lack of information sharing between the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Since then, the Department of Justice has initiated several programs that promote information sharing within and across agencies. Notable among these efforts is the Justice Information Sharing program, which is a collection of initiatives, being In this section, we will address each of these initiatives and then discuss our solutions under the AFOSR funded projects relevant to these initiatives. Section 4.2 discusses JRA. NIEM is discussed in Section 4.3. Justice XML is discussed in Section 4.4. Fusion Centers are discussed in Section 4.5. Security issues are discussed in Section 4.6. Global Justice Information Sharing initiative is discussed in Section 4.7. Details on the DOJ information sharing initiatives can be found in the website of the DOJ Office of Justice Programs [DOJ].
Justice Reference Architecture
The Global Advisory Committee (GAC) of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative recommended the service-oriented architecture (SOA) model for the Justice reference architecture (JRA) which is based on the service-oriented paradigm. It is derived from the OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) Reference Model for SOA 1.0. As stated in the JRA documentation, "JRA is an abstract framework for understanding significant components and the relationships between them within a Service-Oriented Architecture. It lays out common concepts and definitions as the foundation for the development of consistent SOA implementations within the justice and public safety communities."
The requirements of JRA included independence of information sharing partners, scalability, diversity of data source architecture, agility, reuse and sharing of assets and alignment with best practices and experience. JRA documentation also describes the service model for JRA, as well as service policy service contact and service agreement. More details on JRA can be found in [JRA] .
DoDAF is the equivalent of JRA for the DoD. However, DoDAF was developed in the1990s, well before the SOA concepts. However, in mid 2000, DoDAF was architected for SOA. As we have stated earlier, our solution to promoting a federated information sharing approach is to share our research on federated information integration and policy management with the DoDAF community. Similarly, our research on developing a semantic event-based SOA for AISL can contribute to the JRA efforts.
Justice XML
The Global Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML) Data Model (Global JXDM) is an XML standard that has been adapted for representing and exchanging criminal justice information. It enables the law enforcement agencies, public safety agencies, prosecutors, public defenders and the judicial branch to share data effectively. The extent in the databases is represented in XML schema. This way heterogeneous database can be integrated efficiently.
It is stated that states such as Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota are adopting the Global JXDM into their information infrastructures and more than 50 law enforcement and justice-related projects have been implemented utilizing the Global JXDM. Some initiatives have adopted the key elements of the model, and have adapted it to meet their needs. More details on Justice XML can be found in [JUSTICE] .
Like DoJ, DoD has also widely adopted XML for many of their information sharing efforts. For example, the DoD Metadata Registry is utilizing XML. Our research is focusing on technologies beyond XML. We are investigating the use of semantic web technologies such as RDF (Resource Description Framework) and OWL (Web Ontology Language) for representing and reasoning about information, This research is applicable for the needs of both the DoD and the DoJ.
National information Exchange Model
NIEM, the National Information Exchange Model, is a joint initiative between the DoJ and the DHS. As stated in the Justice Information Sharing program, the goal of the NIEM initiative is to develop, disseminate and support enterprise-wide information exchange standards and processes that can enable jurisdictions to effectively share critical information in emergency situations, as well as support the day-to-day operations of agencies throughout the nation. NIEM builds on the Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM). NIEM and GJXDM initiatives enhance each others efforts. For example, GJXDM is used for NIEM implementation. The requirements developed by NIEM can be fed into the GJXDM initiative. It is based on CL schema and supports the National Information Sharing Strategy. Since NIEM and Ucore attempt to achieve similar objectives, the question is why not one model for information sharing? The NIEM/UCore partnership was subsequently formed to achieve multi-agency information sharing. The goal of this initiative was to share information between the justice, public safety, emergency-and disaster-management, intelligence, and homeland security communities. More details on NIEM can be found in [NIEM] .
The AISL framework that we are developing can support the NIEM/UCore model. We provide a semantic infrastructure and associated services for information sharing. Our investigation goes beyond XML and brings in semantic web technologies for information representation and reasoning. We provide reasoning capabilities that are not possible with XML schemas.
Fusion Centers and Intelligent Sharing
As stated in the Justice Information Sharing website, a fusion center is an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources. In addition, fusion centers are a conduit for implementing portions of the merging data from a variety of sources. In addition, fusion centers are a conduit for implementing portions of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). NCISP provides several needs for sharing criminal intelligence information and makes several recommendations for each of the needs. An example need is to: "identify an intelligence information sharing capability that can be widely accessed by local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement and public safety agencies."
Two of the several recommendations to address the above need are: While DOJ was developing plans for intelligence sharing and fusions centers, the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group was developing guidelines for local and state agencies for collecting, sharing and analyzing terrorism-related information. Subsequently, guidelines for fusion centers were developed for law enforcement, intelligence, public safety and the private sector. The goal is for law enforcement, private sector and public safety to work together to safeguard the nation. More details on Fusion Centers and Intelligence Sharing can be found in [FUSION] .
In examining the needs of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and the associated recommendations and comparing them with the DoD Information Sharing Strategy and Implementation Plan, there are many similarities. Both agencies are strongly promoting the establishment of governance structures as well as using standards for data representations. Therefore, the solutions we are developing for the DoD can be applied for the DoJ.
Security and Federated Identity Management
Information sharing involves placing trust on one's partners. Furthermore, appropriate security policies have to be enforced so that confidentiality of the information and privacy of the individuals are protected. In addition, the identity of the partners in a coalition has to be verified. The Global Federated Identity and Privilege Management (GFIPM) framework provides the justice community and partner organizations with a standards-based approach for implementing federated identity. To achieve GFIPM interoperability, we need globally understood metadata across federation systems. As stated in the GFIPM documentation, the GFIPM metadata and framework support the following: The notion of "federation" is at the heart of the GFIPM framework. A federation is defined as a ''group of two or more trusted partners with business and technical agreements that allow a user from one federation partner (participating agency A) to seamlessly access information resources from another federation partner (participating agency B) in a secure and trustworthy manner.'' Credential mechanisms are used to provide identity. GFIPM implements credentials in XML. The components of GFIPM are:
• Identity Provider (IDP)
• Service Provider (SP)
• User Credential Assertions (Metadata)
Within a federation, an organization could be an identity provider and/or a service provider. The identity provider verifies identity and handles account creation, provisioning, password management, and general account management. Service providers provide services such as child protection services and depend on the identity provider to validate the user requesting the service. Federation partners who offer services or share resources are known as service providers. The Global Security Group ensures that GFIPM is compatible with cross domain solutions such as NIEM. More details on security issues can be found in [GFIPM] .
When comparing GFIPM with the DoD information sharing implementation plan, there are similar goals. In fact, Focus area 8 of the implementation states that identity management and access control have to be provided. Identity management will be implemented in accordance with HSPD-12/FIPS-201 and access control will be provided through ABAC. Our research on identity management and access control technologies will be applicable both to the DoD and to the DOJ communities.
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative
The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative is essentially an advisory committee to the Attorney General on information sharing and integration initiatives. This committee is one of the federal advisory committees (FAC The principles that guide the DHS information sharing strategy are the following:
• Fostering information sharing is a core DHS mission • DHS must use established governance structure to make decisions regarding information sharing issues • DHS must commit sufficient resources to information sharing • DHS must measure progress toward information sharing goals • DHS must maintain information and data security and protect privacy and civil liberties
The document states that while there are technological challenges, the major challenge in information sharing is establishing a process and developing protection mechanisms. Lack of trust is also a major challenge. Based on the challenges, DHS has put out its objectives for information sharing including the following:
DHS is involved in developing information sharing standards and protocols as well as appropriate security and privacy policies. DHS is also developing an approach to measure the performance of information sharing. In addition, DHS has produced a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). This plan provides a risk management framework which is based on a public-private partnership that facilitates coordination within and across National Critical Infrastructure and key resources (CIKR . Our research on AISL will contribute towards the framework for information sharing for DHS including risk management and incentive aspects.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
On February 22, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence published the US Intelligence Community's Information Sharing Strategy. It is stated in the report that "the inability or unwillingness to share information was recognized as an Intelligence Community weakness by both the 9/11 Commission and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission. The report also states that since the findings of these commissions, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has stood up and the ISE was formed. The report addresses three major areas:
• Challenging new environment • Information Sharing Strategy • Implementation of the Strategy
The challenges include the changing and evolving threat, the need to transform the Intelligence Community, building an Integrated Intelligence Enterprise, and managing
The implementation strategy focuses on the following building blocks:
The report also states that coordination is key to the Intelligence community. They recognize the need to coordinate their information sharing activities with those of the In comparing the ODNI and DoD's Information Sharing Strategy, the implementation plans are closely aligned. Therefore, our research for the DoD is directly applicable to the ODNI with respect to policy, technology (e.g. SOS and information management), incentives, risk and cost for information sharing.
NATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY
Now that we have explained the information sharing strategies of the four major departments of the United States Government (e.g., DoD, DOJ, DHS, and IC), we will now discuss the National Information Sharing Strategy (NSIS) developed by the White House and published in October 2007. The administration felt that although information sharing had vastly improved since 9/11, there was an urgent need for a National Strategy to share terrorism-and law enforcement-related information at multiple levels. In particular, the counterterrorism officials had the following needs. Therefore, a strategy to address the above needs at the national level was produced. The guiding principles of the strategy were the following:
• 
